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STATE}MNT ON AFGHANISTAN BY E.C. COI.O{ISSION PB"ESIDENT
ROY JENKINS
Roy Jenkins, Presldent of the EC Commission, told
the European Parliament last week that the European
Cormrunity should not al-Iow a wedge to be driven
between the United States and itself. President
Jenkins outlined the EC's position on Afghanistanin a statement to the Parliament,s Political AffairsCormrittee in Brussels on January 3I. This was the weekfollowing his visit to the united states during which he met
with President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, other
members of the US Administration and Congressional leaders.
The text of Presi-dent Jenkins' statement follows:-
"There has been agreement in all institutions of the Community and
throughout the lYestern world in condemning the Soviet takeoyer ofAfghanistan. I do not therefore think that I need to repeat the
almost unanimous views which we hold about the events of a month
ago. The European Parliament passed an impressively worded
resolution on the subject which I know from my own visit to lVashingtonprepared a joyeuse entree for your President, Madame Veil, a few
days later.
You know that at their first meeting after Christmas the MemberStates of the Cormnunity on 15th January issued a strong declaration
condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. This was unambiguous
and demonstrated the solidarity of the lfest in generar and the
Corrnunity in particular towards the Soviet Union.
The Community as such has also wasted no time in reacting within its
area of competence. Already in the first week of January the
Commission exercised its responsibility for managing the market, in
close consultation with the Member States, by
stopping the food aid progranule for Afghanistan as the conditions
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\for its distribution to the population, rather than to the occupyingforces, could not be guaranteed;
taking administrative action, pending confirmation, which was
subsequently forthcoming by the Council, to ensure that there is
no replacement from Conununity stocks of agricultural products
whose export to the Soviet Union the United States had banned;
considering immediately favourably the urgent demand presented
by the U.N. High Conrnissioner for Refugees for immediate aidfor Afghan refugees in Pakistan.
The Connnission is proposing to the Member States that 10 MUA ($14.5
million ) should be set aside for this purpose.
These decisions as you know were confirmed by the Council of Ministers
of 15 January, who laid down the principle that the Community would
not replace either directly or indirectly United States' suppliesfor the Soviet market. The Council requested the Corrnission to take
the necessary steps to ensure the implementation of this policy and
to propose measures for other agricultural products, while respecting
traditional patterns of trade.
Let me now turn in more detail to the action we have taken in the
agricultural fle1d. f make two preliminary points :
Flrst, w€ must bear in mind that in certain respects our situationis different from that of the U.S. in agricultural trade with theSoyiet Union. The Americans actuall-y have a bilateral agreement ongrains, and they export virtuall-y no other agricultural products to
Russia. For them, therefore, the benchmark is relatively simple:
it is the figure of 8 million tons, which they are respecting. Ille,
on the other hand, have no bilateral agreement, our exports to Russia
include several different crop and livestock products, and the volume
of these exports has varied greatly over recent years. It is there-fore far less simple to fix a benchmark for our policy.
Second, there is a distinction to be made between the mechanisms for
monitoring the destinations of our exports, and the limits which we
wish to put to our export to those destinations. The first is aquestion of administrative practice, and the second is a matter ofpolitical and commercial judgment.
On the administrative practices, I arn not going to recite to you a
catalogue of the different measures, such as export certificates,prefixation of restitutions, or adjudicatj-on, that we have adoptedfor the different products.
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I am simply going to say that I am satisfied, and Finn Gundelach(Vice President of the EC Commission with responsibility for
agriculture and fisheries) is satisfied, that, for a1l the products
where it is necessary, we have the necessary instruments to monitor
exports and if necessary to keep them within limits. IVe shal1 keep
these administrative measures under review, and adapt them as the
situation demands. For example, this week we are tightening up
the milk products system in various ways. There will no longer
be export restitutions for fresh butter to the USSR, but a system
of export tenders for stockpile butter. This will permit us to
keep a strict control, and in fact we anticipate no exports of butter
to the Soviet Union in the near future.
On the targets at which we are aiming, Iet me recapitulate rvhat our
recent agricultural exports to the Soviet Union have been. I limit
this to the Soviet Union in order to simplify matters, but it is
obvious that we must take account in our monitoring system of the
other Eastern European countries, through which the Soviets might
try to obtain additional supplies from us indirectly. I also leave
out the year 1979, for rvhich fuII statistics are not yet available.
For wheat, we exported negligible quantities of a few hundred tonnes
in some of the years L974-78. For barley, we exported quantities
varying from 44O thousand tonnes in 1976 to 2OO tonnes in 1977.
I[e exported small quantities of other cereals, such as rye and maize,in some years. I[e supplied significanffifi-tities of ma1t, varying
from 109,000 tonnes in 1974 to 31,000 tonnes in 1977. IVe exported
89,000 tonnes of beef in 1974, but less in subsequent years. Poultry
has varied f rom zffi_j,n Lg75 to 62, ooo tonnes in L977. There were
exports of 2,OOO tonnes of buttei in L974,49,000 tonnes in 1977,
21,OOO tonnes in L978 (and TaO;560 tonnes is estimated for 1979).
There were sma1l quantitites of wine in L974-77 and rather more in
L978.
You will see from the statistics which I have quoted that our tradepattern with the USSR has been highly erratic. Indeed, both we and
the Americans have suffered commercially from the unreliable and
unpredictable nature of Soviet demand for these products. It is
not therefore useful to pick out a figure for a particular year, or
an average figure for a period of years, and to say that it represents
the traditional level or target to which we should adhere. It will
be a matter of judgment for each product.
IVhat I will say is this. Unless and until the Soviet aggression in
Afghanistan is ended, our exports of agricultural produce to the
USSR will not exceed what we judge to be traditional quantitites.fn no case will there be large export deals at special prices, of
the type which happened in L973. lTe shalI ensure that sales are
made in codtrolled quantities and at realistic prices.
4The U.S. Reaction
As you know, I was able to visit the United States last week for
talks with President Carter and members of the Administration at
a time when the Americans are already considering the next steps
in their reaction to Afghanistan. f am happy to be able to tell
you that the United States expressed satisfaction with the action
taken so far by the Community, particularly in the political and
agricultural fields, but did express the hope that we considerfurther steps, notably in the field of common action to control
the granting of officiat export credits to the Soviet Union. This,
the Commission and the Council are currently studying.
The United States regards the consequences of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan as a serious threat to world stability. They
naturally look to the European Cormnunity for political, moral
and practical support. In lYashington f was able to demonstrate
that the Commission, the Councit and the Parliament had offered
a clear demonstration of Western solidarity. I[hiIe sharing the
same view of the seriousness of the Soviet Union action, we do
nevertheless have a slightly different point of view when it comes
to the practical application of some aspects of our policy. Just
as the United States wishes to continue arms limitation talks with
the Soviet Union, so do we wish to pursue detente on tolerable terms.
What we need is :
Community solidarity and cohesion,
not to altow a wedge to be driven between the Community and the
United States,
not to let the Soviet Union believe things will not change but to
make it clear that economic cooperation depends on mutual confidence
which their action has undermined."
